DENUCLEARISATION OF THE KOREAN PENINSU- LA. CONSEQUENCES OF THE MEETING BETWEEN DONALD TRUMP AND KIM JONG UN IN SINGAPORE 12 JUNE 2018

Marian Tadeusz Mencel, PhD – received PhD in social sciences with a specialisation in political science. Scope of academic interest: political, eco-nomic and social affairs in Asia, with a focus on China and Mongolia. Cooperates with the University of Gdansk and Gdansk Higher School of Humanities; e-mail: jm04@o2.pl. ISSN 2450-6869 Volume 3, No. 6, 2018


Introduction
One of the key issues in international relations seems to be the issue of the denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula, which has dangerously escalated in recent years, especially due to the nuclear program implemented by Pyongyang, including 6 nuclear tests and numerous testing of medium to long-range missiles, conducted by the North Korean Armed Forces (Szybalski, 2016). 2 The complex nature of the problem is evidenced by years of multilateral international discussions between the key players of the East Asian political scene, which since the 1960s have failed to stabilise the situation on the Korean Peninsula (Strnad, 2014), 3 despite the involvement of the key players in the game: the United States, China, Japan, Russia and both Korean countries.
Conducting research on the Korean peninsula situation in the light of regional international relations, one could argue that maintaining the status quo of 1953 in relations between both Korean states and major political players in East Asia will not be possible, especially bearing in mind recent events that culminated in the unprecedented historic meeting of the President of the United States with the leader of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.
The political background of these events will be discussed in this lecture. hydrogen bomb test). 5 In November 2017, after a successful attempt at launching an intercontinental missile, Kim Jong Un announced the completion of the development of strategic nuclear forces, stressing North Korea's ability to take pre-emptive or retaliatory actions. 6 In response, Washington indicated that it had not been conducting any military operations against North Korea, and that diplomatic means were the most important tool for resolving the conflict 7 .
During the annual public address of 1 January 2018, Kim Jong Un emphasised the power of North Korean strategic weapons: "The entire United States is within the range of our nuclear weapons, the button is there on my desk and it is not just an empty threat. This year, we should focus on the deployment and operational use of mass-produced nuclear warheads and ballistic missiles that will only be used when our nation faces a threat." 8 Later in his address, however, Kim changes the provocative tone and declares that Pyongyang is interested in normalising relations with South Korea and concluding a permanent peace agreement instead of the 1953 ceasefire. He also proposes to stop nuclear and missile programs if South Korea withdraws from annual joint military drills with the US Army. 9 Such a change in rhetoric was possible partly thanks to Moon Jae-in, who took the of-  One should neither underestimate the increased involvement of Washington diplomacy in solving the Korean problem by political means. Most probably, in order to protect its own threatened political and, more importantly, economic interests, Beijing put pressure on Pyongyang, approving of sanctions against it and a diplomatic offensive. A key factor that stimulated Chinese involvement with the North Korea issue was Donald Trump's strategy focused on the escalation of multidirectional actions in order to force the North Korean regime into negotiations, which did not exclude the most complex policy toolwar against Py-15 Cf. M. Kokot, Trump w Azji. Próbuje ugadać chińskiego prezydenta Xi w sprawie osłabienia północnokoreańskiego reżimu, http://wyborcza.pl/7,75399,22620396,titru-w-azji-probuje-ugadac-chinskiego-prezydenta-xi-wsprawie.html, [retrieved: 15.11.2017]; Misja ostatniej szansy kilka dni po wizycie Donalda Trumpa. Chiny nie chcą znaleźć się na "liście wroga" Kim Dzong Una. Specjalny wysłannik Xi Jinpinga uda się do Pjongjangu, https://nczas.com/2017/11/15/misja-ostatniej-szansy-kilka-dni-po-wizycie-donalda-trumpa-chiny-nie-chcaznalezc-sie-na-liscie-wroga-kim-dzong-una-specjalny-wyslannik-xi-jinpinga-uda-sie-do-pjongjangu/, ongyang. 19 If this happened, Beijing would be forced to take sides, and due to its historical ties with North Korea, and, above all, China's aspirations to become a regional power, it would likely support Kim's regime. Considering that the Chinese economy has not yet reached the level of development that would enable the People's Liberation Army to face the joint forces of the United States, South Korea and Japan, Beijing had to take the most prudent steps, that is exerting diplomatic pressure on Pyongyang. into account all opinions, the prevailing one is that neither party emerged victorious during the Singapore Summit. 34 The opinion that Kim's move was purely motivated by the desire to improve his public image may also be justified, which seems to be corroborated by the report of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), that points out that North Korea is still conducting nuclear (3) Military reality, which shows that territorial conquest still determines the ultimate winner of war. In China's eyes, Korea is mainly viewed as a subject that should fulfil his obligations to the Lord, who, in turn, is obliged to guarantee it peace and means to live. In the new political reality, Chinese politicians must find a way to maintain relations with Pyongyang without undermining international relations in the region. 54 The denuclearisation process of North Korea requires significant commitment on the part of South Korea, which can be seen in Seoul's increasingly frequent meetings at the highest level. During the recent one, in September 2018, the North Korean leader Kim Jong Un and the president of South Korea Mun Jae-in agreed on some important issues that gained the status of an inter-state agreement. Pyongyang agreed that international inspection would monitor the permanent dismantling of key missile facilities and that the main nuclear research centre in Jonbjon would be closed 55 . Moreover, Kim declared he was willing to "permanently dismantle" the main machinery for the production of fuel for nuclear warheads. Still, he did not express his intention to completely abandon nuclear weapons or missiles. 56 No schedule for further steps was agreed on, either. Nevertheless, the societies of both Korean states have become noticeably closer to each other, which is another political success of Km Jong Un, who is aiming at "reducing the risk of a US military strike to essentially zero". 57  In an effort to normalise the relations between North Korea and Japan, resumed unofficially in Vietnam in July 2018, a Japanese government representative visited Pyongyang in October 2018. While Pyongyang proposed a meeting of the highest state authorities, Tokyo did not address that suggestion. 61 Therefore, one could hardly say it was a breakthrough meeting.
At the beginning of November 2018, Pyongyang, irritated by fruitless attempts at lifting sanctions, issued a warning that the lack of expected results will force the North Korean authorities to resume the development of the regime's nuclear weapons arsenal, stressing that North Korea is not going to abandon the ongoing nuclear negotiations with Washington. Despite this, the US was accused of not honouring the commitments made by Kim Jong Un and Donald Trump at the Singapore Summit. A statement made by the North Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs criticised the policy of the White House to use diplomatic pressure combined with economic restrictions against the regime as a tool to achieve denuclearisation on the Korean Peninsula. 62 To make it look more serious, North Korea carried out a test of a new weapondescribed in a report of the South Korean press agency's as a strategic weapon -63 which is thought to be a long-range artillery gun. Kim Jong Un personally participated in the tests. 64 The US military, however, did not seem to notice a significant threat in Pyongyang's operations, as during the G-20 session in Argentina, President Donald Trump announced that his next meeting with the North Korean leader would probably take place in January or February 2019. 65 Watching the transformations taking place in the international environment of East Asia, the US approach towards North Korea should be regarded as appropriate, despite the world media and many political experts being critical about the consequences of the historic meeting of the US president with the leader of the DPRK. The possibility of using force against the North Korean regime, which Donald Trump had not ruled out until recently, and moreover, which he had even warned about, seems the least realistic option. Certainly, China as well as South Korea will be opposing this solution, as many citizens of those countries have family ties with the North Koreans. Also, the current South Korean authorities prefer a policy based on discussion, consultation and soft diplomatic pressure, as well as economic incentives towards Pyongyang. Involvement in a military conflict would put another financial burden on Washington, which Donald Trump tries to avoid as much as possible. In addition, the possibility of China backing North Korea in order to defend its sphere of influence, certainly acts as a deterrent to White House decision makers.
However, one cannot rule out the possibility that the North Korean leader is playing a double game, aimed solely at receiving economic benefits, humanitarian aid and opening of markets, while repeating empty declarations of North Korea's intention to meet the expectations of denuclearisation and completely put an end to the strategic weapons and missile industry. It would not come as a surprise if Kim Jong Un's foreign policy was directed at attempts to normalise relations with the United States, without venturing beyond what is acceptable to Beijing, which is now the sole guarantor of North Korea's political security and the only country willing to cooperate with the North Korean regime against the American policy of sanctions and diplomatic pressure. Kim's pro-China approach may also be an indicator of the dictator's fear of overthrowing the regime, especially after full nuclear disarmament, and, in Pyongyang's view, nuclear weapons are the only guarantee of security now. South Korea will play a huge role in facilitating further progress in denuclearisation. Seoul should continue its diplomatic and economic efforts so as to encourage the regime to become increasingly involved in international structures working for regional peace and stability. After all, delaying finding a solution to the Korean problem does not benefit any side, although it would seem that maintaining the status quo is the best option.
Further development of North Korea's nuclear weapons may prompt South Korea and Japan to build their own nuclear arsenal, allowing for a balance of power in the region, and emboldening Pyongyang to take risks beyond the country's capabilities, thus increasing the likelihood of war on the Korean Peninsula (Kissinger, 2017), which the United States, bound by military alliances with those countries, would inevitably join. If China also got involved, the conflict could take on supra-regional proportions leading to a global disaster.
From this perspective, the actions of the American president, though sometimes considered as "naive", deserve the full support of all interested parties in the international community. Maintaining order in global or regional relations requires a subtle balance of restraint, strength, and principles, both established ones and those currently being established. Balance understood in a military sense will certainly turn into confrontation, and the ideological approach to partnership will only intensify fears of hegemony. What is therefore required are diplomatic tools that will be able to make use of all stabilising factors in a balanced way.