Perception of resilience in the security policy of the North Atlantic Alliance and the Republic of Poland

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Abstract

Objectives: The purpose of the article is to present the place of resilience in the security strategy of the North Atlantic Alliance and the Republic of Poland. This is particularly important in the context of the Russian Federation’s military aggression against Ukraine and Moscow’s attempts to destabilize other regions. In light of such a stated goal, the following research problem was established: will the concept of resilience to threats become a key concept for NATO and Polish security policy in the third decade of the 21st century?

Methods: The research methods used in the research process primarily included analysis of source materials (legal acts), scientific studies and publications of government institutions.

Results: The results of the study confirmed the thesis that the concept of resilience now occupies a very important place in the security policy of the North Atlantic Alliance and Poland. This is their response primarily to the aggressive policies of the Russian Federation: the attack against Ukraine, threats against NATO (including Poland), the attempt to destabilize the situation in other regions of the world. NATO, including Poland, has realized the need to build efficient collective defense mechanisms and resilience to military and non-military threats.

Conclusions: Conclusions of the research indicate that the North Atlantic Alliance is increasing its emphasis on creating resilience to threats. Unfortunately, in Poland, the apt provisions of the National Security Strategy regarding resilience and universal defense have so far remained only in the realm of declarations.
Introduction

With the end of the Cold War, the myth of the "end of history" and misconceptions about the nature of security threats prevailed in many countries. A significant number of authors, politicians and social elites have concluded that classical war is now just a relic of history, while states and societies will struggle primarily with threats of a non-military nature (terrorism, organized crime, threats to environmental and health security, etc.). There have been fundamental changes in the structures of the armed forces of most Western countries, which have reduced their defense capabilities and transformed armies from defensive to expeditionary. Unfortunately, warnings about the Russian Federation's resurgent dreams of a return to the days of empire were ignored (Vladimir Putin's speech in Munich in 2007, the attack on Georgia in 2008, the intervention in Syria).

Russian aggression against Ukraine in 2014, the annexation of Crimea and support for separatist republics in eastern Ukraine, caused a shift in the security policy of the North Atlantic Alliance. Leaders of states and commanders of military structures have drawn attention to the neglect of collective defense preparations and the need to build resilience to threats. Also in the 2020 National Security Strategy of Poland appeared the concept of resilience and – for the first time since the 1990s – collective defense.

1. Resilience - terminology

The Cambridge dictionary defines resilience as the action or facts that keep people from doing something (Śliwa, Wojciechowski, 2021, p. 75). In turn, the Polish language dictionary defines it as "the ability to resist something, not to submit to some action, pressure, influence, etc., insensitivity to what, endurance." The dictionary's authors state that in the past the concept was synonymous with resistance, giving an example: "The crews of Vilnius developed such resilience that despite the greatest efforts of the monastic troops of both masters - because the Livonian also came to their aid - the siege came to nothing" (Odporność, 2022). The PWN dictionary presents the word "resistant" as "insensitive to physical or moral influences" (Odporny, 2022).

Resilience also plays an important role in the security sphere, having a bearing on the ability to respond in a crisis situation. As stated by the authors of the report of the Institute for National Strategic Studies in Washington, the combination of resilience in a crisis situation and the ability to resist (resistance) in the event of occupation are important signals to both a potential adversary and allies (Śliwa, Wojciechowski, 2021, p. 75). This makes it possible to...
demonstrate the resilience of society and the readiness of state authorities to take real action to deter an adversary and defend the state, which is important in the context of the provisions of Articles 3 and 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which are the foundation of allied responsibility and solidarity:

„Article 3. In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack

(…)"

Article 5. The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security” (The North Atlantic Treaty, 1949).

Considering the state as a form of social organization, Jamie Shea considers resilience as a key element of security. According to him, the components of this concept are:

− preparedness of society and the state,
− infrastructure preparedness,
− internal solidarity and consistency of purpose,
− shared situational awareness,
− coordination of means and modes of response,
− cooperation with partner states.

This important NATO Headquarters official assesses that resilience is and will continue to be an essential element of defense to effectively counter hybrid threats and survive in the event of war or occupation (Śliwa, Wojciechowski, 2021, pp. 75-76).

In recent years, one of the increasingly important aspects of societies’ resilience has been the cyber dimension as a medium referring to the media and social networks as dimensions of influence. The latter are sometimes actively used as part of strategic communications and
psychological operations. Their purpose is to have a destructive effect on social unity, to radicalize sentiment through the use of at least fake news, but also to attack selected targets, causing social discontent or limiting civilian and military capabilities in countering threats (Śliwa, Wojciechowski, 2021).

2. Resilience in the security policy of the North Atlantic Alliance

Resilience is, so to speak, the "first line" of defense for the Alliance. According to Article 3 of the Washington Treaty, the Allies are obliged to create and maintain capabilities to resist armed attacks. During the "Cold War," NATO and all Allied countries had extensive civilian structures to take care of building resilience and readiness to repel attack. After the fall of the "Iron Curtain," this issue lost its importance. Only in 2014, in the wake of Russia's actions in Ukraine, did the Alliance begin to adapt to new security threats and develop mechanisms to respond to them. At NATO summits in Newport in 2014 and Warsaw in 2016, member leaders decided not only to strengthen deterrence and collective defense mechanisms, but also to promote countries' commitment to increasing resilience. The Allies pledged to implement agreed requirements to enhance national resilience in seven critical sectors (Seven Baseline Resilience Requirements), which define and describe the critical civilian functions that underpin the alliance's ability to defend itself. The government, various civilian ministries, the armed forces, but also the private sector and non-governmental organizations are involved in the resilience-building tasks. These actors, according to the alliance, have a very large role to play when it comes to bringing about the building of national resilience (Współpraca, 2022).

One of the conclusions of the July 8-9, 2016 North Atlantic Alliance summit in Warsaw was that the heads of state and government of the member countries decided to adopt a joint commitment to strengthen resilience and to continuously develop - in accordance with Article 3 of the Washington Treaty - individual and collective capabilities to repel a possible attack on NATO countries. In the Alliance's understanding, resilience is a very important element of deterrence policy, which is designed to force a possible adversary to abandon an attack by convincing it that an attack will not enable it to achieve its objectives, or will be too costly for it (Rey, 2022).

The strengthening of resilience is to be carried out in accordance with the guidelines, captured in the form of seven baseline requirements. As envisioned, they help NATO member states to have a common understanding of the principles guiding resilience strengthening, first of all, effective support for armed forces in the European theater of operations, contributing to deterrence, but at the same time to the smooth functioning of the state in a crisis and protection
of the population. In building resilience in this way, it is envisaged that the military and non-military system will work together starting from the planning phase.

These seven guidelines relate to:

- continuity of government operations and ensuring key state processes,
- energy supply,
- capacity to respond to mass uncontrolled migration,
- water and food supply,
- capacity to respond to incidents with large numbers of casualties,
- provision of communications,
- civilian transportation (Rey, 2022).

Three domains were included in the resilience work:

- public sector,
- public-private partnerships,
- society.

The domain encompassing the public sector, including civil-military interaction, resulted in the so-called "whole of government approach" (civil and military) to strengthening security. Over time, the cooperation and assumptions of this domain did not end with mere declarations, but were reflected in real actions (creation of documents, policies, making joint assessments or conducting exercises both military and civilian at the international and national levels). It should be noted that civil-military cooperation, although an ongoing task that requires constant monitoring and improvement, has improved significantly, and the guidelines for resilience help in its development and common understanding of the needs and requirements of each sphere.

Analyzing the second domain, public-private cooperation, it should be noted that the Alliance depends on civilian resources for most of its activities and operations. According to various assessments, up to 90% of tasks related to logistics and procurement of the armed forces are carried out by the private sector. Such a comprehensive approach therefore makes it possible to adopt appropriate regulations, including contracts with private entities, to maintain civilian capabilities and increase the ability to support troops.

As mentioned, the third domain that makes up effective resilience is society, and more specifically, its awareness of potential threats, its ability to respond adequately, and its committed attitude in countering dangerous phenomena or trends. The Alliance already in late 2017 undertook the first work on the possibility of involving society in building resilience, as it is often the main target of attacks, including hybrid attacks in particular. It was for this reason
that the Polish side, which is not infrequently confronted with hybrid threats, launched an initiative to intensify this work. This was met with the support of the majority of the Allies. At the same time, it is important to realize that the issue of obtaining social resilience is not simple due to different traditions, to the varying understanding of the issue in member states and many other aspects (Rey, 2022).

In view of the complicated situation surrounding the territory of the North Atlantic Alliance, preparations in both the military and civilian spheres in case it deteriorates further are of particular importance. The Alliance is also taking steps to strengthen its resilience to threats, currently paying attention primarily to hybrid threats. Resilience has become one of the prerequisites for credible deterrence and defense and for the effective fulfillment of NATO's core tasks. In the Alliance's own assessment, the current resilience guidelines are just the bare minimum to ensure the ability of the armed forces to perform their tasks, especially in view of the need to join collective defense. Creating resilience in a number of areas is essential in order to be able to fulfill, nationally, the obligations under Article 3 of the Washington Treaty (Współpraca, 2022).

Accordingly, the main objectives of civilian planning within the North Atlantic Alliance are considered to be:

- maintaining continuity of governance during possible war or hybrid operations, including so-called "subliminal" operations, i.e. those conducted below the threshold of war,
- increasing the effectiveness of the use of national civilian resources and infrastructure for both civilian and military purposes,
- protecting and assisting the population,
- preventing and countering emergencies,
- resilience strengthening activities according to criteria relating to: effectively secured continuity of public administration and key services provided; supply of energy, water and food; guaranteed functioning of communications and transportation systems, as well as the ability to cope with uncontrolled population movements and multiple fatalities (Współpraca, 2022).

The cooperation of countries within NATO ensures the exchange of information on past and planned undertakings - national and international from the civilian, as well as civil-military sphere, enabling the sharing of experiences and good practices. Regular exchange of information, concern for similar standards and procedures, planning and coordination of certain undertakings, and, above all, joint exercises, benefit each participating state, facilitating the
interaction (interoperability) of institutions and services responsible for security (Współpraca, 2022).

Civilian planning in NATO (the so-called five CEP roles) includes:

− civilian support for the Alliance's military activities under Article 5 of the Washington Treaty (collective defense);
− support for emergency response activities not arising from Article 5 of the Washington Treaty;
− support of the authorities of a country in the event of a civil emergency;
− support to the authorities of a country in the area of civil protection in the event of the use of agents of mass destruction (CBRN);
− cooperation with partners (Współpraca, 2022).

The issue of resilience has become, as confirmed by the NATO Summit in Brussels on June 14, 2021, one of the key aspects of the organization's activities. According to NATO's Agenda 2030 document, resilience is to be achieved not only by implementing and monitoring the commitments already made under the seven areas of resilience, but also by:

− strengthening critical infrastructure (land, maritime, space and cyber),
− strengthening key industries (by protecting them from hostile economic activity),
− diversifying supply chains.

The exact provisions are outlined in the Strengthened Resilience Commitment. In turn, the 79-point communiqué from the Brussels Summit included references to resilience in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, deterrence and defense, hybrid threats, civil-military cooperation, climate change and modern technologies, among others. It was decided in Brussels that the Alliance will continue its adaptation in such a way as to take into account the fact of global superpower rivalry, especially in the context of China's rising power and Russia's aggressive policies. This will be served, among other things, by the work that has begun on a new Alliance strategy and the NATO Agenda 2030, which contains certain guidelines and priorities for the activities of the entire North Atlantic Alliance (Współpraca, 2022).

It is reasonable to assume that the Russian invasion against Ukraine will trigger further initiatives to build the resilience of NATO and member states and their societies.

3. State resilience in the National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland

The current National Security Strategy, signed in 2022 by the President of the Republic of Poland, discusses - in addition to the security environment and values, national interests and
strategic objectives in the field of national security - four pillars of national security. These include:

1. Security of the state and citizens,
2. Poland in the national security system,
3. National identity and heritage,

The first pillar - along with such strategic goals as national security management, the Polish Armed Forces, cyber security and the information space - includes the concept of state resilience and universal defense.

Pillar I, defining one of the national interests defined as guarding independence, territorial inviolability, sovereignty and ensuring the security of the state and its citizens, is to be realized, among other things, by "increasing the state's resilience to threats, through the creation of a system of universal defense, based on the efforts of the entire nation, and building an understanding of the development of the resilience and defense capabilities of the Republic of Poland." (National Security Strategy, 2020)

The latest "Dictionary of Security Terms" defines universal defense as a type of national defense that engages all resources available to the state to counter any threat (Pawłowski, Zdrodowski, Kuliczkowski, 2020, p. 136). Universal defense - is one that, for the permanent protection and defense in situations of threats to spiritual, cultural, political, economic and state values and interests, prepares and uses all human, spiritual, material and territorial resources of the state (Jakubczak, Marczak, Gąsiorek, 2008, pp. 112-113).

To achieve this strategic goal, the authors of the strategy postulate:

- to build a universal defense system that would fully utilize the potential of state and local government institutions, entities of the education and higher education system, local communities, business entities, non-governmental organizations and citizens, and that will constitute a comprehensive state resilience to both non-military and military threats,
- to build the state's resilience to threats, including those of a hybrid nature, to ensure the universal nature of civil defense and civil protection, and to build up and maintain the capacity to restore the necessary resources,
- developing the capacity of the health care system and public administration structures to combat epidemic threats, especially highly contagious and particularly dangerous diseases,
- building knowledge and capacity to shape national security, based on broad involvement of public authorities, including local government, units forming the education and higher
education and science systems, the economy, non-governmental organizations and citizens for adaptation to ever-changing needs, in conjunction with the promotion of patriotic attitudes, civic duties and pro-social behavior,

– building social capital through the formation of cooperation skills, networks of formal and non-formal social organizations and the formation of a community of values in Polish society,

– redefining the civil defense and civil protection system, giving it a universal character, both in urban areas and in rural areas, with an emphasis on building the system's ability to continuously adapt to changing challenges and threats,

– increasing resilience to threats primarily in the areas of: continuity of government and functioning of the state, effective energy supply, uncontrolled movement of people and relocation of the population, collection, protection and management of food and water resources, capacity to deal with mass events, resilient telecommunications networks and ICT systems, public information and warning systems, and a capable transportation system,

– implementation of a model for the protection of critical infrastructure, consisting of ensuring its continuity of operation and the services it provides,

– introducing a unified system of personnel resource management, including the administration of personnel reserves for national security, taking into account the priority for the Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland,

– developing the state's ability to prevent and respond to threats of a terrorist nature and to combat organized crime, taking into account criminal activity in cyberspace,

– strengthening the certainty of legal transactions by: ensuring effective legal protection for citizens, a smoothly functioning judiciary and proper enforcement of court decisions,

– continuing to strengthen counterintelligence security of state organs and critical infrastructure, adequate to the increasing activity of foreign intelligence services - both in the military and civilian spheres,

– building social capital through the formation of cooperation skills, networks of formal and non-formal social organizations, and the formation of a community of values in Polish society,

– developing the capabilities of the state's special services for the early identification of threats,

– implementation of activities in the field of planning and spatial development of the country, including in the maritime areas of the Republic of Poland, i.e. internal waters, territorial
sea, contiguous zone and exclusive economic zone, within the framework of public purpose investments, taking into account the requirements of security and defense of the state and the resulting needs for their financing,

− creation in the area of planning and land use conditions for effective and efficient consideration of the needs of national security,

− creation, in the area of non-military defense preparations, of optimal legal and organizational conditions for flexible action in conditions of external threat to state security in times of peace, crisis and war,

− strengthening inter-ministerial coordination for the development of the capabilities of the national industrial and technological base in defense, in accordance with the needs of state security, including, among other things, selective mobilization of activities for the mobilization of the economy and the needs of the Polish Armed Forces,

− to take into account within the strategic reserve system the needs arising from changes in the security environment,

− increasing capabilities in the field of cryptology, manufacturing telecommunications equipment equipped with cryptographic modules composed of microelectronic components manufactured in Poland and proprietary software,

− building capacity for technology development and production of strategic resources in times of peace, crisis and war (National Security Strategy, 2020).

Conclusion

The coronavirus pandemic and then the Russian aggression against Ukraine demonstrated vividly the need for further efforts to strengthen resilience to threats, both of individual states and societies, and of the North Atlantic Alliance as a whole. Awareness of the need to develop a coherent concept of a resilient society in NATO - but also in the European Union - gives hope that it will become one of the key concepts in the development of European and Atlantic security policy. The events of the past few years and months have highlighted the need to prepare for the emergence of threats of both a non-military nature (such as those harming security in cyberspace or health security) and of a military nature, related to Russia's return to the open use of military tools in international relations combined with an attack on an independent state.

Under such conditions, an important role in building NATO's resilience may fall to Poland as a key state on the eastern flank. Unfortunately, much of the assumptions presented in the
current National Security Strategy of Poland remain only in the declarative sphere. Even the provisions of the Law on Defense of the Homeland of March 11, 2022, already promulgated after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, remaining at least with the voluntariness of military service, or the lack of a new and adequate to modern realities law on civil protection show a misunderstanding of the idea of universal defense as a foundation for building the resilience of the state and society to threats.

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