Nuclear Proliferation Risks in Selected Turkic States: Türkiye, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan
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Nuclear and Quantum Engineering, Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology, Korea (South)
Submission date: 2025-05-11
Final revision date: 2025-07-14
Acceptance date: 2025-07-14
Online publication date: 2025-08-25
Publication date: 2025-08-25
Corresponding author
Eryk Marchlewski
Nuclear and Quantum Engineering, Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology, Daejeon, Korea (South)
Przegląd Nauk o Obronności 2024;(20):101-114
KEYWORDS
ABSTRACT
Objectives:
This study investigates the nuclear legacies, current developments, and proliferation risks in three Turkic states: Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Türkiye. While these countries have not been central to global non-proliferation debates, recent geopolitical shifts, regional instability, and rising interest in nuclear energy have increased their relevance. The research explores each state's nuclear ambitions—driven by security concerns, economic goals, and geopolitical positioning—and outlines proliferation-related threats in these countries while offering actionable solutions to mitigate them.
Methods:
The research is based on a qualitative, document-based approach. It analyses open-source materials such as reports from international organizations (e.g., the IAEA), government policy papers, and publications from respected think tanks. The focus is on each country’s nuclear history, current policy trajectory, and the broader strategic context affecting proliferation risks.
Results:
Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, as major uranium producers, face risks primarily associated with material
security and regulatory oversight. Türkiye, although lacking large uranium reserves, poses distinct challenges due to its expanding civilian nuclear program and strong political ambitions to become dominating power in the region. The study identifies that recent dynamics in global order destabilize security environment within and around Turkic States, which may cause intensification of arms race. Currently there are no sufficient international, oversight mechanisms to control it.
Conclusions:
The paper recommends improved regional cooperation and the establishment of a dedicated nuclear
supervising body under the Organization of Turkic States (OTS). Such a framework would promote transparency, mitigate proliferation risks, and ensure that nuclear developments in the region align with peaceful and internationally accepted standards
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