Objectives:
The future verification of the nuclear disarmament poses different challenges. The International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification is working on these challenges. The verification methods and approaches are very different so they can greatly influence the outcome of the inspection activities.

Methods:
These methods and approaches can be identified in other, already functioning arms control arrangements and confidence and security building measures. The methods and approaches have their advantages and disadvantages, so the planning of different verification activities have to take into account these aspects.

Results:
The future nuclear disarmament verification can be achieved by combining the methods of verification. The availability of technology also can contribute for verification of nuclear disarmament without entering sensitive areas, thus the states can comply with the provisions of the Non-proliferation Treaty. The use of different sensors for verification can complement the on-site inspection activities by providing for the inspectors data on the outline of specific site. After the certification of the sensors, states can use those under specific information barriers. The recording of findings of a verification activity also important for planning future inspection missions, and in case of non-compliance they can be used as factual evidence in different negotiations.

Conclusions:
For this purpose the network maintained by the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe can be viewed as a model that ensures the confidentiality of the notifications.