The impact of information bombs on social security: a global analysis and Japanese perspective
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These authors had equal contribution to this work
Submission date: 2025-05-05
Final revision date: 2025-07-16
Acceptance date: 2025-07-16
Online publication date: 2025-07-21
Publication date: 2025-07-21
Corresponding author
Dariusz Filipiak
Doctoral School, Military University of Technology, Sylwestra Kaliskiego 2B Street, 00-908, Warsaw, Poland
Przegląd Nauk o Obronności 2024;(20):66-78
KEYWORDS
ABSTRACT
Objectives:
The aim of this article is to provide a detailed analysis of the impact of information bombs, i.e., organized disinformation campaigns, on global social security, with a particular focus on Japan and its vulnerability to media manipulation, as well as the social and political consequences thereof.
Methods:
The article uses scientific literature, empirical data, and international reports, enriched with a case study of the sarin attack in Tokyo, to show the mechanisms and effects of disinformation in the context of social and political threats.
Results:
It has been identified that information bombs lead to information chaos, social disintegration, escalation of panic, weakening of trust in institutions, and increased susceptibility to propaganda, especially in crisis situations and in highly developed countries, political divisions, and increased susceptibility of citizens to manipulation and destabilizing narratives.
Conclusions:
Combating disinformation requires systemic measures: implementing information verification tools, raising public awareness, media education, and cooperation between institutions to protect social order and democracy. Another major problem is the lack of public awareness and failure to verify published information. Information itself is not dangerous. What is dangerous are social reactions, including the manipulation of public opinion and the possibility of causing panic.
The circulation of harmful and false content can have complex ethical and practical implications for key principles such as freedom of expression and media pluralism. It can also contribute to chaos and panic in a community and increase feelings of insecurity.
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