Objectives:
The objective of the article is to analyse supply chains as an element of state security under conditions of non-kinetic influence. Particular attention is given to mechanisms of interference within supply chains and their consequences for the state’s capacity to respond, taking into account structural complexity, multi-stage organisation, and the limited detectability of such actions.

Methods:
The article is based on a qualitative comparative analysis employing a polemological approach and the case study method. The analysis relies on triangulation of secondary sources, including institutional reports, industry materials, academic literature, and documented cases of supply chain interference, which enables the identification of recurring patterns and mechanisms of influence.

Results:
The results indicate that the vulnerability of supply chains is structural in nature and derives from their complexity, the dispersion of responsibility, and the selective and probabilistic character of control mechanisms. The analysis demonstrates that interference can be effectively embedded in routine and legally functioning economic processes, including the digital and informational layer, which facilitates the accumulation of effects and the emergence of cascading impacts at later stages of supply chain operation.

Conclusions:
The article confirms that disruptions to supply chains may be employed as a tool of long-term, non-kinetic influence on the state, leading to a gradual weakening of institutional response capacities. From the perspective of state security, this necessitates treating supply chains as a permanent space of vulnerability, requiring an analytical approach that goes beyond logistics and procedural compliance.