Objectives:
The purpose of this research project is to examine how nuclear deterrence intersects with the concept of security dilemma, i.e., when a state takes an action intended to increase its own security it may inadvertently create a risk or threat to another state and contribute to increased levels of tension. Fourth, how nuclear and conventional systems are becoming increasingly interconnected, which will serve to potentially amplify risks associated with these systems.

Methods:
Utilizing a qualitative analytical approach of documents such as national strategy documents, defense policy statements and historical records of crises dating from 1945-2025, the study identifies four primary concepts. First, how the credibility of nuclear threats are viewed differently across states. Second, how states view differing levels of risk in terms of escalation.

Results:
The results of the study demonstrate that nuclear weapons can provide security through mutual vulnerability (i.e., they can help stabilize an unstable relationship). The degree to which this occurs depends upon whether states have reliable second-strike forces. Moreover, new technologies (e.g. cyber warfare, hypersonic weapons, etc.) are reducing decision timeframes and creating greater incentives for states to act pre-emptively. Third, the need to maintain survivable second-strike capabilities

Conclusions:
The authors conclude the study by identifying the implications for global stability and providing several policy recommendations to better manage nuclear risks in a rapidly changing strategic environment.